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1 Introduction.
The standard framework in which economists evaluate environmental policies is cost-benet
analysis. Consider, for example, a carbon tax to reduce global warming. By distorting
relative prices, this policy would impose an expected ow of costs on society in excess of
the government tax revenues it generates. Presumably, it also yields an expected ow of
benets. Households and rms would burn less fuel, less CO
2
would accumulate in the
atmosphere, global mean temperatures would not rise as much, and the damage caused
by higher temperatures would be correspondingly smaller. The standard framework would
recommend this policy if the present value of the expected ow of benets exceeds the present
value of the expected ow of costs. Any debate among economists would likely be over the
expected costs and benets, or over the choice of discount rate.
This standard framework ignores three important characteristics of most environmen-
tal problems and the policies designed to respond to them. First, there is almost always
uncertainty over the future costs and benets of adopting a particular policy. With global
warming, for example, we do not know how much average temperatures will rise with or
without reduced CO
2
emissions, nor do we know the economic impact of higher tempera-
tures. Second, there are usually important irreversibilities associated with environmental
policy. These irreversibilities can arise with respect to environmental damage itself, but also
with respect to the costs of adopting policies to reduce the damage. Third, policy adoption
is rarely a now or never proposition. In most cases it is feasible to delay action and wait for
new information, or at least begin with policies that are limited in their scope and impact.
Environmental policy involves two kinds of irreversibilities, and they work in opposite
directions. First, policies aimed at reducing ecological damage impose sunk costs on society.
These sunk costs can take the form of discrete investments; for example, coal-burning utilities
might be forced to install scrubbers, or rms might have to scrap existing machines and invest
in more fuel-ecient ones. Or they can take the form of ows of expenditures, e.g., a price
premium paid by a utility for low-sulfur coal. In either case, such sunk costs create an
opportunity cost of adopting a policy now, rather than waiting for more information about
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ecological impacts and their economic consequences. This opportunity cost biases traditional
cost-benet analysis in favor of policy adoption.
Second, environmental damage can be partially or totally irreversible. For example,
increases in GHG concentrations are long lasting; even if radical policies were adopted to
drastically reduce GHG emissions, these concentrations would take many years to fall. Also,
the damage to ecosystems from higher global temperatures (or from acidied lakes and
streams, or the clear-cutting of forests) can be permanent. This means that adopting a
policy now rather than waiting has a sunk benet, i.e., a negative opportunity cost, which
biases traditional cost-benet analysis against policy adoption. Hence it may be desirable
to adopt a policy now, even though the traditional analysis declares it uneconomical.
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At issue is whether these irreversibilities are important, and if so, what their overall
eect is. The answer is likely to depend on the nature and extent of uncertainty. In general,
two types of uncertainty are relevant. The rst is economic uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty
over the future costs and benets of environmental damage and its reduction. In the case
of global warming, even if we knew how large a temperature increase to expect from any
particular increase in GHG concentrations, we would not know the resulting cost to society
| we cannot predict how a temperature increase would aect agricultural output, land use,
etc.
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The second type is ecological uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the evolution of the
relevant ecosystems. For example, even if we knew that we could meet a specied policy
target for GHG emissions over the next forty years, we could not predict the resulting levels of
atmospheric GHG concentrations at dierent points in time, nor could we predict the average
global equilibrium temperature increase and how that increase would vary regionally.
3
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This point was made some two decades ago by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and Krutilla and
Fisher (1975), and has been elaborated upon by Fisher and Hanemann (1990), among others.
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Likewise, there is considerable uncertainty over the costs of acid rain; even if we could predict the increase
in acidity in lakes and rivers from NOX emissions, the impact on sh and other organisms is uncertain, and
hence so is the social cost. For most environmental problems there is uncertainty over the future social cost
of the environmental degradation, and thus over the social benet of any policy response.
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Even given assumptions about economic growth in dierent parts of the world, predicting GHG emissions
(in the absence or presence of policy intervention) is dicult, and subject to considerable uncertainty. For
a forecasting model of CO
2
emissions with an explicit treatment of forecast uncertainty, see Schmalensee,
Stoker, and Judd (1998). For general discussions of the uncertainties inherent in the analysis of global
2
Recent studies have begun to examine the implications of irreversibility and uncer-
tainty for environmental policy, at times drawing upon the theory of irreversible investment
decisions.
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Kolstad (1992) developed a three-period model to study the implications of cost-
benet uncertainty for the adoption of an emissions-reducing policy that can involve sunk
costs. In his model, the accumulated stock of pollutant is permanent. Emissions can be
reduced in the rst or second periods, and between these periods there is a reduction in
uncertainty over the net benets from a lower stock of pollutant. He shows that if there is
no sunk cost of policy adoption, the faster is the rate of learning, the lower is rst-period
emissions. This is a version of the result of Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974);
because the stock of pollutant is permanent, society should pollute less now if there is uncer-
tainty over the future damage from the pollutant. But Kolstad goes on to show that if the
cost of policy adoption is at least partly sunk, the eect of uncertainty on the initial level of
emissions is ambiguous.
5
Hendricks (1992) developed a continuous-time model of global warming similar to the
one in this paper. As I do, he studied the timing of policies to irreversibly reduce emissions,
allowing for a (partially) irreversible accumulation of the pollutant. The particular form of
uncertainty he considers is over a parameter linking the global mean temperature increase
to the atmospheric GHG concentration, and he allows for learning by assuming that the
uncertainty over this parameter falls over some xed period of time. He focuses on how the
speed of learning aects the timing of policy adoption.
6
warming, see Cline (1992) and Solow (1991). Similar uncertainties exist with respect to acid rain. For
example, we are unable to accurately predict how particular levels of NOX emissions will aect the future
acidity of lakes and rivers, or the viability of the sh populations that live in them.
4
For an introduction to and overview of the literature on irreversible investment, see Dixit (1992) and
Pindyck (1991). For a more detailed treatment, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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Kolstad (1996) also obtains this general result in the context of a two-period model. In related work,
Hammitt, Lempert, and Schlesinger (1992) use a two-period model to study implications of uncertainty for
adoption of policies to reduce GHG emissions, and show that under some conditions it may be desirable to
wait for additional information. Kolstad (1994) and Kelly and Kolstad (1998) also examined GHG emission
policy in the context of a growth model with uncertainty and learning about the value of an unknown
parameter. Kolstad nds that temporary emission-reduction policies dominate permanent ones, and Kelly
and Kolstad characterize the rate of learning in a Bayesian context and show its implications for policy.
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Although he did not do so, Hendricks could also use his model to study the implications of the degree
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Finally, related studies by Chao (1995) and Narain and Fisher (1998) deserve mention.
Chao examines randomly arriving catastrophic damage from GHG emissions, where the
probability of arrival is increasing the emissions rate. Narain and Fisher also develop a
model with both ecological and economic irreversibilities. The uncertainty is with respect to
the Poisson arrival of a \catastrophe" that drives utility permanently to zero, with a mean
arrival rate that is an increasing function of the stock of pollutant. Hence the probability
of a \catastrophe" over any period can be reduced by investing in pollution reduction. This
kind of uncertainty has a very limited eect | it simply increases the eective discount rate.
In this paper, I assume that information arrives continually, but there always remains
uncertainty over the future evolution of key environmental variables, and over the future costs
and benets of policy adoption. I focus on how irreversibilities and uncertainty interact
in aecting the timing and design of policy. The next section begins by laying out the
basic analytical framework, and shows how policy design and timing can be treated as
an optimal stopping problem. I consider policies, which entail a ow of sunk costs, to
reduce emissions of a pollutant which accumulates. In Section 3, I consider a model with
economic uncertainty, i.e., there is uncertainty over the future social cost of any given stock
of pollutant. I rst consider the case in which policy adoption implies reducing emissions to
zero, and then the case in which the size of the reduction can be chosen optimally at the time
of adoption. In addition, I examine the policy timing problem for both linear and convex
economic benet functions. In Section 4, I allow for gradual emission reductions, again
in the presence of economic uncertainty. Section 5 examines the implications of ecological
uncertainty by allowing the evolution of the stock of pollutant to be stochastic. Section 6
concludes.
of irreversibility of environmental damage, by varying the parameter that describes the rate of natural GHG
removal from the atmosphere. Conrad (1992) also developed a continuous-time model of emission control,
in which the social cost of pollution is a quadratic function of the stock of pollutant, with a coecient that
uctuates as a geometric Brownian motion. The linear-quadratic structure implies that emissions will be
zero (a maximum rate) if this coecient exceeds (is below) a critical value. He shows that this critical value
is a declining function of volatility. However, the only irreversibility is with respect to the stock of pollutant,
so the results are along the line of those in Henry and Arrow and Fisher.
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2 Analytical Framework.
In order to get at the basic issues and obtain results that are reasonably easy to interpret,
I introduce a model that captures the basic stock externality associated with many envi-
ronmental problems in as simple a way as possible, while still allowing for key sources of
uncertainty. LetM
t
be a state variable that summarizes one or more stocks of environmental
pollutants. For example, M might be the average concentration of CO
2
in the atmosphere,
the acidity level of a lake, forest, or the concentrations of a mix of pollutants that make up
urban smog. Let E
t
be a ow variable that controls M
t
, e.g., the rate of CO
2
or SO
2
emis-
sions. I will assume that absent some policy intervention, E
t
follows an exogenous trajectory.
Ignoring uncertainty for the time being, the evolution of M
t
is given by:
dM=dt = E(t)  M(t) ; (1)
where  is the natural rate at which the stock of pollutant dissipates over time.
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I will assume that the ow of social cost associated with the stock variableM
t
is specied
by a function B(M
t
; 
t
), where 
t
shifts over time, perhaps stochastically, to reect changes
in tastes and technologies. For example, if M is the GHG concentration, shifts in  might
reect the development of new agricultural techniques that reduce the social cost of a higher
M , or alternatively, demographic changes that raise the cost.
One would generally expect B(M
t
; 
t
) to be convex inM
t
(at least when M
t
is suciently
large). However, for simplicity I will initially assume that B is linear in M , i.e.,
B(M
t
; 
t
) =  
t
M
t
: (2)
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This is a simplied version of a basic diusion model used by Nordhaus (1991) to compare costs and
benets of policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. That model supplements eqn. (1) with an
adjustment process for temperature:
dT=dt = [M(t)  T (t)] ;
where T is the increase in mean temperature from GHGs, M is atmospheric GHG concentration from
industrial activity, and  is a delay parameter. Associated with a higher T is a (global) economic cost
resulting from, among other things, land loss due to a rising sea level, and reduced agricultural output due
to climate change. I am simplifying things by dropping the variable T and associating an economic cost
directly with M . Also, note that at this point eqn. (1) is deterministic; later I will introduce ecological
uncertainty by generalizing this equation so that M follows a controlled diusion process
5
Note that uncertainty over the future costs and benets of policy adoption can be introduced
by letting  follow a stochastic process.
The implications of uncertainty and irreversibility are easiest to see by focusing on policies
that are introduced at a specic point in time, and that have a long-term impact on the
evolution of E
t
, although I will also consider policies that are introduced gradually. Consider
a policy introduced at time T that changes the evolution of E
t
for t  T . It would presumably
impose a ow of costs on society, some portion of which will be sunk. I denote the present
value (at time T ) of the expected ow of sunk costs associated with this policy by K(E
T
; !),
where ! is a vector of policy characteristics. For example, ! might describe an absolute
reduction in E
t
, or a reduction in the expected rate of growth of E
t
.
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Initially, I will assume that policy adoption involves a once-and-for-all reduction in E
t
to
some new and permanent level E
1
, with 0  E
1
 E
0
. I will also begin by assuming that
the social cost of adopting this policy is completely sunk, and its present value at the time
of adoption is a convex function of the size of the emission reduction, which I denote by
K(E
1
).
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The policy objective is to maximize:
W = E
0
Z
1
0
B(M
t
; 
t
)e
 rt
dt   E
0
K(E
1
)e
 r
~
T
; (3)
subject to eqn. (1). Here,
~
T is the (in general, unknown) time that the policy is adopted,
E
0
 E
1
is the amount that emissions are reduced, E
0
denotes the expectation at time t = 0,
and r is the discount rate. Thus we have an optimal stopping problem | we must determine
when it is optimal to commit to spending K to reduce E
t
, given the (possibly stochastic)
dependence of M
t
on E
t
, and given the stochastic evolution of 
t
.
8
For example, we might have an emission level E
t
that, absent a policy intervention, will grow stochasti-
cally according to:
dE
t
= 
E
E
t
dt+ 
E
E
t
dz
E
:
Then, a policy might involve a one-time reduction in E
T
(thereby reducing the expected value of E
t
for all
t  T ), or it might involve a reduction in 
E
, the expected rate of growth of E
t
.
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Note that the policy might entail a ow of sunk costs over time (e.g., expenditures for insulation on all
new homes). All that matters is that adopting the policy implies a commitment to this ow of costs, so that
we can replace the ow with its present value at the time of adoption.
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3 Economic Uncertainty.
I introduce economic uncertainty by allowing the social benet function to shift stochastically
over time. I will begin by assuming that policy adoption implies reducing E from its initial
level E
0
to zero. I also assume for now that the cost of emissions reduction as a linear
function of the size of the reduction, and B(M
t
; 
t
) is a linear function of M
t
. Hence if it is
optimal to reduce E at all, it is indeed optimal to reduce it to zero. Later I will make the
cost of reducing emissions a convex function of the size of the reduction, and let the size of
the reduction be a policy choice variable.
I introduce uncertainty by letting  follow a geometric Brownian motion:
d = dt+ dz : (4)
This means the current ow of social cost from a level of pollutant M
t
is known, but the
future ow of social cost is always uncertain, and the amount of uncertainty grows with the
time horizon. Thus we learn about the social cost of pollution as time passes, but the ow
of social cost in the future will always be unknown. Of course one might argue that for some
environmental problems, most or all of the uncertainty over social costs will eventually be
resolved. (In eect, this means that  in eqn. (4) will fall over time.) For problems such as
global warming, acid rain, and species extinction, there is little evidence of such a resolution
of uncertainty (as opposed to a continuing evolution of our assessment of social costs).
Suppose the cost of reducing E from E
0
to zero is given by K = kE
0
. We want a policy
adoption rule that maximizes the net present value function of eqn. (3) subject to eqn. (4)
for the evolution of , and eqn. (1) for the evolution of M . This problem can be solved using
dynamic programming by dening a net present value function for each of two regions. Let
W
N
(;M) denote the value function for the \no-adopt" region (in which E
t
= E
0
), and let
W
A
(;M) denote the value function for the \adopt" region (in which E
t
= 0).
Since B(M
t
; 
t
) =  
t
M
t
, we know W
N
(;M) must satisfy the Bellman equation:
rW
N
=  M + (E
0
  M)W
N
M
+ W
N

+
1
2

2

2
W
N

: (5)
(Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts, e.g., W
N
M
= @W
N
=@M .) Likewise, W
A
(;M)
7
must satisfy the Bellman equation:
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rW
A
=  M   MW
A
M
+ W
A

+
1
2

2

2
W
A

: (6)
These two dierential equations must be solved for W
N
(;M) and W
A
(;M) subject to
the following set of boundary conditions:
W
N
(0;M) = 0 ; (7)
W
N
(

;M) = W
A
(

;M) K ; (8)
W
N

(

;M) = W
A

(

;M) : (9)
Here, 

is the critical value of  at or above which the policy should be adopted. Condition
(7) reects the fact that if  is ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Condition (8)
is the value matching condition; it simply says that when  = 

and society exercises its
option to adopt the policy, it incurs a sunk cost K = kE
0
and hence receives the net payo
W
A
(

;M) K. Condition (9) is the \smooth pasting condition;" if adoption at 

is indeed
optimal, the derivative of the value function must be continuous at 

.
These dierential equations and associated boundary conditions have the solution:
W
N
(;M) = A

 
M
r +    
 
E
0

(r   )(r +    )
; (10)
and
W
A
(;M) =  
M
r +    
; (11)
where A is a positive constant to be determined, and, from boundary condition (7),  is the
positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2

2
(   1) +    r = 0, i.e.,
 =
1
2
 


2
+
s



2
 
1
2

2
+
2r

2
> 1 : (12)
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Eqns. (5) and (6) can be written in more compact form as
rW =  M + (1=dt)E
t
(dW ) :
Thus the social return on W
N
or W
A
has two parts, the ow of social cost  M , and the expected rate of
increase in W (or \capital gain").
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Note from eqn. (10) that W
N
has three components. The rst term on the right-hand
side of (10) is the value of the option to adopt the policy at some time in the future. The
second term is the present value of the ow of social cost resulting from the current stock
of pollutant, M . (The current stock, M , decays at the rate , while  has an expected rate
of growth , so the present value is  M=(r +    ).) The third term is the present value
of the ow of social cost that would result if emissions continued at the rate E
0
forever.
(The present value of the ow of cost from emissions E
0
now is E
0
=(r +    ), but
the present value of of the ow of cost from emissions E
0
now and in all future periods is
E
0
=(r +    )(r  ).) This last component of social cost is reduced by the value of the
option to reduce emissions, i.e., the rst term. Once the policy has been adopted, E = 0
and the value function W
A
applies. Then the only social cost is from the current stock of
pollutant.
There are still two unknowns, the constant A and critical value 

at which the policy
should be adopted, and they are determined from boundary conditions (8) and (9):
A =

   1
K

 1
"
E
0
(r   )(r +    )
#

; (13)


=
 
K
   1
!"
(r   )(r +    )
E
0
#
: (14)
Eqns. (13) and (14) apply for any sunk cost of policy adoption, K. If we make use of
our assumption that K = kE
0
, these equations become:
A =

   1
k

 1
"

(r   )(r +    )
#

E
0
; (15)
so that the value of the option to adopt the policy is linear in E
0
, and


=
 

   1
!
k(r   )(r +    )=E
0
: (16)
Note that in the absence of any uncertainty or irreversibilities, it would be optimal to adopt
the policy when  reached a level such that:

(r   )(r +    )
= k : (17)
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The left-hand side of eqn. (17) is just the present value of the ow of social cost from one
extra unit of emissions now and throughout the future (adjusted for the absorption rate ),
and the right-hand side is the cost of permanently reducing emissions by one unit. Hence
eqn. (17) is a standard cost-benet calculation. We can rewrite the equation in terms of a
critical value 

that triggers policy adoption:


= k(r   )(r +    )= :
When there is uncertainty, this critical level 

is simply increased by the factor =(   1).
Note that an increase in  implies a decrease in  and hence an increase in 

. The more
uncertainty there is over the future social cost of the pollutant, the greater is the incentive
to wait rather than adopt the policy now, and hence the greater must be the current cost in
order to trigger adoption. An increase in the discount rate r increases the value of the option
to adopt the policy and thus also increases 

. The cost, K, is paid in the future when the
policy is adopted; hence an increase in r implies a greater reduction in the present value of
that cost, so that the option to adopt is worth more but it should be exercised later. An
increase in , the rate of \depreciation" of the stock of pollutant, also increases 

; a higher
value of  implies that the environmental damage from emissions is more reversible, so that
the sunk benet of adopting the policy now rather than waiting is lower.
Also, observe that an increase in the initial rate of emissions E
0
leaves 

unchanged (but
increases the value of society's option to adopt the emission-reducing policy). The reason is
that K = kE
0
, so that 

is independent of E
0
, and A increases linearly with E
0
. Finally,


is also independent of M . Because B(M; ) is linear in M (so that the value functions
W
N
and W
A
are linear in M), any given level of M
t
implies the same reduction in social
welfare if the policy is adopted at time t as it does if the policy is not adopted. Hence
W
N
(;M) W
A
(;M) is independent of M , and so is 

.
We can frame this timing problem in terms of a comparison of the opportunity costs of
current adoption with the corresponding opportunity \benets" by calculating W

  W
0
,
where W

is the value function when the adoption decision is made optimally, and W
0
is the
value function when the policy is adopted immediately. Suppose  < 

, so that it is not yet
10
optimal to adopt the policy, andW

= W
N
. SinceW
0
= W
A
 K,W

 W
0
= W
N
 W
A
+K,
or
W

 W
0
= K + A

 
E
0

(r   )(r +    )
: (18)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (18) is the direct cost of current adoption. The
second term is value of the option to adopt, and since adoption implies \killing" this option,
it is an opportunity cost of current adoption. The last term is the present value of the
additional ow of social cost from continued emissions, and thus is an opportunity \benet"
of current adoption. Since  < 

and W

 W
0
> 0, the direct cost and opportunity cost
outweigh this opportunity benet, and adoption should be delayed.
Note that as the model is currently structured, it would never be optimal to reduce
emissions by anything less than 100 percent (assuming it would optimal to reduce emissions
at all). The reason is that with K = kE
0
, the value of the option to adopt the policy,
A

, is linear in E
0
, so that W
N
and W
A
are linear in M and E
0
. Shortly we will make
K a nonlinear function of the reduction in emissions, and examine policies that involve a
one-time partial reduction in emissions, as well as gradual incremental reductions.
A Numerical Example.
A numerical example will help to explore the characteristics of the solution. Suppose
that  = 0 (so that the social cost per unit of M is expected to remain constant), r = :04,
 = :02,  = :20,  = 1, E
0
= 300,000 tons per year, 
0
= $20 per ton, and k = 6667 so
that K = kE
0
= $2 billion. Then, from eqns. (12), (13), and (14),  = 2.0, A = 1,953,125,
and 

= $32 per ton. Hence at the current value of 
0
= 20, the policy should not be
adopted. However, the value of the option to adopt it in the future, A

, is $0.78 billion.
The policy should be adopted when  reaches $32 per ton; at that point A

= $2.0 billion,
and boundary conditions (8) and (9) are satised. Figure 3 shows this solution graphically
for the case in which M = 0 (so thatW
A
= 0 for all values of ). Note that 

is found at the
point of tangency of W
N
with the line W
A
 K, and since M = 0, W
A
 K is a horizontal
line at  K. (If M were greater than zero, we would have W
A
=  M=(r +    ), so we
would rotate both the W
N
() curve and the line W
A
 K downwards.)
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Figure 3 shows 

as a function of  for  = .01 and .02. Note that 

rises sharply with
. This is partly due to the fact that we have framed the policy problem as an all-or-nothing
proposition, but it nonetheless suggests that assessing uncertainty over the future costs and
benets of emission reduction may be particulary critical to the policy adoption decision.
As mentioned in the Introduction, environmental policy debates often focus on the dis-
count rate. However, for many environmental problems, the range of plausible discount
rates is much smaller than the range of plausible degrees of uncertainty. It is therefore use-
ful to examine the sensitivity of 

to both r and . This can be done by calculating the
semi-elasticities d log 

=dr and d log 

=d, which are given by:
d log 

dr
=
(2r +    2)
(r   )(r +    )
 
1
(   1)
2
q
(=
2
 
1
2
)
2
+ 2r=
2
;
and
d log 

d
=
(2r + 2
2
=
2
  )((=
2
 
1
2
)
2
+ 2r=
2
)
 1=2
  2
(   1)
3
:
Table 1 shows these semi-elasticities, along with 

, for dierent values of r and . (In
all cases,  = 0,  = .02, K = $2 billion, and E
0
= 300,000 tons per year.) Note that
a .01 change in r results in approximately the same percentage change in 

as does a .1
change in . But this does not mean that the discount rate is a more important determinant
of environmental policy. First, plausible values of the real discount rate are conned to a
small range | for analyses of global climate change, for example, between .02 and .05. But
plausible values for  (or the standard deviation of other stochastic state variables) can fall
within a much larger range. Second, most traditional cost-benet analyses of environmental
policy are done by implicitly assuming that  = 0. Hence even if the correct value of  is
only .2 or .3, just accounting for uncertainty can matter a lot.
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Table 1: Semi-elasticities of 

.
r  

d log 

=dr d log 

=d
.04 .2 32.0 33.33 3.33
.04 .4 59.71 27.23 2.89
.04 .6 101.47 23.48 2.43
.04 .8 158.38 21.25 2.04
.02 .2 13.96 52.64 4.47
.06 .2 56.56 24.54 2.77
.08 .2 87.48 19.47 2.43
3.1 Convex Costs and Partial Reduction in Emissions.
We now consider policies that only partially reduce emissions. We will assume that the sunk
cost of the policy is a quadratic function of the amount that emissions are reduced:
K = k
1
(E
0
  E
1
) + k
2
(E
0
  E
1
)
2
; (19)
where E
0
  E
1
is the amount of the reduction, and k
1
; k
2
> 0. Thus the cost of a 1-unit
(permanent) reduction in E is k(E) =  dK=dE
1
= k
1
+ 2k
2
(E
0
  E
1
). We must again nd
a rule (in the form of a critical value 

) for the optimal timing of policy adoption, but now
we must also determine the optimal size of the reduction, i.e., the optimal value of E
1
.
As before, let W
N
(;M) and W
A
(;M) be the value functions for the \no-adopt" and
\adopt" regions respectively. W
N
(;M) must again satisfy the Bellman eqn. (5). However,
eqn. (6) is no longer the correct Bellman equation for W
A
(;M). After adoption of the
policy, dM=dt = E
1
  M , so we must include an additional term, E
1
W
A
M
, where E
1
is
the emissions level after policy adoption. Hence W
A
(;M) now satises:
rW
A
=  M + (E
1
  M)W
A
M
+ W
A

+
1
2

2

2
W
A

:
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The solution for W
A
(;M) is therefore:
W
A
(;M) =  
M
r +    
 
E
1

(r   )(r +    )
; (20)
while the solution for W
N
(;M) is again given by eqn. (10), i.e.,
W
N
(;M) = A

 
M
r +    
 
E
0

(r   )(r +    )
:
Since E
1
is chosen optimally, it depends on  at the time of adoption, i.e., on 

. Hence
although boundary condition (7) will still apply, conditions (8) and (9) become:
W
N
(

;M) =W
A
(

;M) K(E

(

)) ; (21)
and
W
N

(

;M) = W
A

(

;M) 
dK
dE

dE

d

: (22)
Using eqns. (20) and (19), we choose E

to maximize the net payo from policy adoption:
max
E
[W
A
(;M ;E) K(E)] =  
M
r +    
 
E
1

(r   )(r +    )
  k
1
(E
0
  E)   k
2
(E
0
  E)
2
; (23)
so that
E

= E
0
+
k
1
2k
2
 

2k
2
(r   )(r +    )
: (24)
We now substitute this expression for E

into boundary conditions (21) and (22), and then
use these conditions to nd 

and the constant A. Making the substitutions and denoting
  (r   )(r +    ), we nd that 

must satisfy the quadratic equation:
(   2)
2

2
  2(   1)k
1
 + 
2
k
2
1
= 0 :
Because W
A
() W
N
() K(E

()) is convex in , 

is the largest root of this quadratic
equation, i.e.,


=
(   1)k
1
(   2)
2
4
1 +
v
u
u
t
1 
(   2)
(   1)
2
3
5
: (25)
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Then, A is given by:
A =

2
4k
2

2
(

)
 2
 
k
1
2k
2
(

)
 1
+
k
2
1
4k
2
(

)

: (26)
Given 

, we can nd E

(

) from eqn. (24). It is easy to conrm that as  increases (so
that  decreases), 

will increase and E

will fall. However, we must account for the fact
that E

must lie between 0 and E
0
.
Let 
max
denote the value of  for which E

= 0. From eqn. (24), we see that 
max
=
k
1
=+2k
2
E
0
=. Hence E

 0 implies that 

 
max
= k
1
=+2k
2
E
0
=, or equivalently,
that   2 + k
1
=k
2
E
0
.
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If  is suciently large so that  < 2 + k
1
=k
2
E
0
, eqns. (25) and
(26) will no longer apply. Instead, E

is constrained to be zero and so is no longer a choice
variable. In that case the solution to the optimal timing problem is again given by eqns.
(13) and (14) (with K = k
1
E
0
+ k
2
E
2
0
). Also, we must have E

 E
0
, but this will always
be the case; observe from eqns. (24) and (25) that E

(

) < E
0
for any  > 2.
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Figure 3.1 illustrates this. First, it shows the conventionally calculated NPV from policy
adoption, when E
1
can be chosen optimally according to eqn. (24). That NPV is equal to:
(=)[E
0
  E

()]  K(E

()) :
This NPV is a quadratic function of , and applies for values of  for which 0  E

()  E
0
;
in this range, the NPV is increasing in . Also shown is the value of the option to adopt
an emission-reducing policy, which is equal to A

. The critical value 

is at the point
where the option value A

is just tangent to this NPV, i.e., where the value matching and
smooth pasting conditions (21) and (22) hold. Figure 3.1 shows this solution for the following
numerical example: E
0
= 300; 000 tons per year, k
1
= 5000 and k
2
= :0055 (so that the cost
of reducing E to zero would be about $2 billion),  = :045, and as in the earlier example,
 = 0, r = :04,  = :02, and  = 1. In this case, a policy is never adopted for  < 
min
= 12
(even if  is reduced to zero), and 
max
= 20. For  = :045,  = 6:8, so that 

= 17, i.e.,


< 
max
so that E

> 0. From eqn. (24), we see that E

= 110; 606 tons per year.
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Thus the condition from eqn. (25) that  > 2, which implies that 
2
< r   2, will always be satised.
12
It might appear from eqn. (24) that if  is very small, E

will exceed E
0
. But as  becomes smaller, 

becomes larger, so that E

< E
0
always.
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The amount that emissions are reduced depends on the degree of uncertainty over the
future benets from a reduction, and on other parameters. Figure 3.1 shows the dependence
of both E

and 

on  for this numerical example. (In the gure, 

is multiplied by 10
4
so that it can be plotted with E

on the same scale.) When  = 0, the standard NPV rule
applies; the policy should be adopted if   12. If  is just slightly greater than 12, the
policy is adopted but emissions are reduced only very slightly. (The reason is that in this
numerical example,  = 0, so that if  = 0,  cannot rise in the future.) As  is increased,
the critical value 

also increases, and E

falls. Note that for  > :063, E

= 0, so that 

is given by eqn. (14) (with k
1
E
0
+ k
2
E
2
0
substituted for K) rather than eqn. (25).
We can likewise determine the dependence of 

and E

on other parameters from eqns.
(14), (24), and (25). For example, a higher initial level of emissions, E
0
, does not aect the
critical value 

, but does imply a commensurately higher ending level E

(so that the size
of the reduction is unchanged). Also, an increase in k
1
increases 

, but an increase in k
2
has no eect on 

, although it increases E

.
3.2 Convex Benet Function.
We have assumed that the benet function B(M; ) is linear inM , which makes the optimal
policy rules independent of M . This was convenient, but for most environmental problems,
the damage from a pollutant is like to rise more than proportionally with the stock of the
pollutant. Then the optimal policy rule will depend on the stock. To explore this, we
again make the cost of an emission reduction linear in the size of the reduction, and assume
emissions must be reduced to zero once a policy is adopted, so that K = kE
0
. But now we
let the benet function B(M; ) be quadratic in M :
B(M; ) =  
t
M
2
t
: (27)
The value functions W
N
(;M) and W
A
(;M) for the \no-adopt" and \adopt" regions
will again satisfy the Bellman equations (5) and (6), but with the term  M replaced by
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 M
2
in each equation. Boundary conditions (7) { (9) also apply. These equations have
the following solution:
W
N
(;M) = A

 
M
2
r + 2   
 
2
2
E
2
0

(r   )(r + 2   )(r +    )
 
2E
0
M
(r + 2   )(r +    )
; (28)
and
W
A
(;M) =  
M
2
r + 2   
; (29)
where A is a positive constant to be determined, and  is again given by eqn. (12). Note
that the right-hand side of eqn. (29) and the second term on the right-hand side of eqn. (28)
is the present value of the ow of social cost from the present stock of pollutant, M . The
third and fourth terms on the right-hand side of eqn. (28) are the present value of the ow
of social cost from future emissions at the rate E
0
. The rst term on the right-hand side of
(28) is the value of the option to reduce emissions to zero.
Using boundary conditions (8) and (9), the constant A and critical value 

are:
A = E
0

   1
k

 1
"
2
2
E
0
+ 2(r   )M
(r   )(r + 2   )(r +    )
#

; (30)
and


=
(r   )(r + 2   )(r +    )k
2(   1)[E
0
+ (r   )M ]
: (31)
The critical value 

now depends on M ; a higher value of M implies a higher marginal
social cost from additional emissions, and therefore a lower value of  at which it is optimal
to begin reducing emissions. (For the same reason, a higher M increases the value of the
option to reduce emissions.) The rising marginal social cost of emissions likewise implies
that the higher is the current emission level, E
0
, the lower is 

. As before, a higher cost of
emission reduction, k, and a higher decay rate, , lead to a higher value of 

.
Most important, uncertainty aects the optimal adoption rule the same way it does when
B(;M) is linear in M . The parameter  aects 

through the multiplier (   1)=, and 
is given by the same equation (12) as before. Hence making the benet function convex in
M aects the optimal policy adoption rule, but it does not aect the way that rule depends
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on uncertainty over the future social costs of pollution. The critical value 

for the certainty
case is multiplied by the same factor as before.
4 Gradual Emission Reductions.
In the preceding section we assumed that there would be only one opportunity to adopt an
emissions-reducing policy. This is not terribly unrealistic; given the political diculties of
reaching a concensus and introducing a major new environmental policy, it is unlikely that
regulations could be revised frequently. On the other hand, assuming that such regulations
could never be revised (once a new policy is in place) is extreme. Rather than making
arbitrary assumptions about the allowed frequency of policy change (or making assumptions
about \menu costs" of policy change so that the frequency is endogenous), I will assume the
opposite extreme | that the level of emissions can be reduced gradually and continuously.
Comparing the optimal policy in this case with that from the preceding section provides
insight into how the frequency with which regulations can be introduced or changed aects
the optimal timing and design of policy.
In this section I will again assume that the cost of any incremental emission reductions is
completely sunk, which is equivalent to assuming that emissions can only be reduced. (This
assumption can easily be relaxed by making the cost of emission reductions only partly
sunk.) Policy makers must observe both  and the stock variable M , and decide when and
by how much to mandate emissions reductions in response to changes in these variables.
For this problem to be of interest, either the benet function or the cost function must
be convex. I will assume that the benet function B(;M) is linear in  and M , and that
the cost of the policy is a quadratic function of the amount that emissions are reduced, as
in eqn. (19). Thus the cost of a 1-unit reduction in E is K = k
1
+ 2k
2
(E
0
  E
1
). Letting
m
1
= k
1
+ 2k
2
E
0
and m
2
= 2k
2
, the cost of an incremental reduction is:
K = m
1
 m
2
E : (32)
Since B
t
=  
t
M
t
, the payo ow from a small reduction in the stock of pollutant, M
t
,
is just B
t
=  
t
M
t
. If emissions are reduced incrementally by an amount E at time
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t = 0, the corresponding change in M
t
is
M
t
=  
E

h
1  e
 t
i
; (33)
so the social benet from an incremental reduction in emissions at time t is:
W
t
= E
t
Z
1
t
B

e
 r( t)
d = 
t
E= ; (34)
where   (r   )(r +    ). Given the current 
t
, we must determine how far to reduce
emissions initially, and how to make further reductions in response to changes in .
This is analogous to the incremental investment and capacity choice problem in Pindyck
(1988). Suppose E
t
= E currently, and let W (E; ;M) be the value function given this E,
and given  and M . Let F be the value of society's option to (permanently) reduce E by
one unit. Note that the cost of exercising that option is F (E; ;M) + K(E), and the
payo is W (). Then F must satisfy the Bellman equation:
rF = (E   M)F
M
+ F

+
1
2

2

2
F

; (35)
subject to the boundary conditions:
F (E; 0;M) = 0 ; (36)
F (E; 

;M) = W (

) K(E) ; (37)
F

(E; 

;M) = W

(

) : (38)
Since W and K are independent ofM , F will be independent ofM , and the solution
has the usual form:
F = a

; (39)
with  > 1 again given by eqn. (12). Emissions should be reduced whenever  exceeds the
critical value 

(E), with d

=dE < 0. The constant a and the critical value 

(E) are found
from boundary conditions (37) and (38):


(E) =
(m
1
 m
2
E)
(   1)
; (40)
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a =
 


!


   1
m
1
 m
2
E

 1
: (41)
To interpret (40), note that (m
1
 m
2
E)= is the amortized sunk cost of an incremental
reduction in emissions, normalized by the absorption rate . Since B(;M) is linear, in
the absence of uncertainty it would be optimal to reduce emissions to the point where this
amortized sunk cost is just equal to , the social cost per period of an incremental unit of the
stock of pollutant, M . With uncertainty, the threshold exceeds this amortized sunk cost by
the multiple =(  1). Also, note that as E is reduced, 

rises (and a falls). Depending on
the initial value of , it may be optimal to initially reduce emissions by some large amount,
and then later reduce emissions gradually when  increases and hits the boundary 

. For
any value of E, 

is increased if  increases, and is decreased if the decay rate  increases.
Finally, given 

(E), we can determine the optimal emissions level E

.
Monte Carlo Simulation.
In this model, uncertainty aects the initial level of mandated emissions reductions, and it
also aects the maximum allowed emissions level over time. I used a numerical example and
ran a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the magnitude of these eects and its dependence
on . In this example, the initial emissions level is E
0
= 300; 000 tons per year, the cost
function parameters are k
1
= 5000 and k
2
= :0055 (so that the cost of reducing E from
300,000 tons per year to zero would be about $2 billion), and r = :04,  = :02, and  = 1.
I set  = :01, so that even absent uncertainty, emissions will gradually be reduced as 
increases. I varied  from 0 to .15, in increments of .005. For each value of , I ran 10,000
simulations of the evolution of  and the corresponding optimal emissions level E

.
Figure 4 shows the results of this Monte Carlo simulation for the mean optimal emissions
level initially, and after 20 years. Note that when there is no uncertainty (i.e.,  = 0),
emissions are initially reduced from 300,000 to about 70,000 tons per year, and then reduced
gradually to zero as  and the corresponding social cost of pollution rises. As  is increased,
the initial allowed emissions level increases, reecting the value of waiting. Emissions are
still reduced over time (although reductions occur stochastically when  > 0), but the mean
value of E

after 20 years also increases with .
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Figure 4 shows the mean and median times until the optimal emissions level has been
reduced to zero. Both the mean and median times should increase monotonically with ,
because increases in  increase the threshold 

(E) for every value of E. In the gure, the
mean time decreases for  > :13, but this is an artifact of the Monte Carlo simulation. (In
each run, the model was simulated for 1000 years, and for large values of , there will be
runs for which it takes longer than this for E

to reach zero. In addition, the number of
runs at this tail of the distribution is very small.) Note that because the distribution of the
time until zero emissions is asymmetric, the mean time will exceed the median time for all
 > 0. The dierence between the mean time and median time illustrates an important
aspect of the eects of uncertainty. There is a value of waiting (i.e., reducing emissions less
than would be the case otherwise) because of the possibility that  will not increase as much
as expected. For  > 0, there are indeed realizations in which it takes a very long time for
 to grow to the point where eliminating emissions is justied.
5 Ecological Uncertainty.
So far, the only form of uncertainty that we have considered has been over the parameter 
that shifts the benet function B. In this section, I will assume that  remains xed, but
that there is uncertainty over the evolution of M . Specically, I replace eqn. (1) by:
dM = (E   M)dt + dz : (42)
Thus even if the trajectory for E
t
were known, future values of M would be uncertain (and
normally distributed).
13
For uncertainty of this kind to have any eect on policy timing or design, the benet
function B(;M) must be convex in M . The reason is that if this function were linear in
13
It might seem more natural to assume that future values of M are lognormally distributed, i.e., to
describe the evolution of M by
dM = (E   M)dt+ Mdz ;
so that M could never become negative. I use eqn. (42) instead because it simplies the numerical solution
of the model. The basic results would still apply if M were lognormally distributed.
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M , stochastic uctuations in M would have no eect on the expected marginal social return
from reductions in E, and thus could not aect the optimal policy. This would be true even
if the cost of emission reduction, K(E), were a nonlinear function of the size of the reduction.
We will therefore assume that the benet function is quadratic in M , i.e., B(M; ) =
 M
2
t
. For simplicity, we will also assume that the (sunk) cost of an emission reduction is
linear in the size of the reduction, and that emissions must be reduced to zero once a policy
is adopted. Thus the cost of policy adoption is K = kE
0
.
We can now proceed as before, writing the Bellman equations for the value functionsW
N
and W
A
in the \no-adopt" and \adopt" regions:
rW
N
=  M
2
+ (E
0
  M)W
N
M
+
1
2

2
W
N
MM
; (43)
rW
A
=  M
2
  MW
A
M
+
1
2

2
W
A
MM
: (44)
The value functions must also satisfy the boundary conditions:
W
A
M
(0) = 0 ; (45)
W
N
(M

) = W
A
(M

) K ; (46)
W
N
M
(M

) = W
A
M
(M

) ; (47)
where M

is the critical value of M that triggers policy adoption. Note that condition (45)
applies to the slope ofW
A
(M) atM = 0, and not the level. Because M follows an arithmetic
(rather than geometric) Brownian motion, M = 0 is not an absorbing barrier, so we do not
have a simple boundary condition for the value of W
A
(0). However, since B(M; ) =  M
2
,
and W
A
applies when E = 0, W
A
must reach its maximum at M = 0.
There is now only one state variable (M), so that eqns. (43) and (44) are ordinary
dierential equations. The solution of (44) and boundary condition (45) for W
A
is:
W
A
(M) =  
M
2
r + 2
 

2

r(r + 2)
: (48)
This is just the present value of the ow of social cost from the current stock of the pollutant,
M , accounting for stochastic uctuations inM (even when M = 0). Note that an increase in
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 implies an increase in the magnitude of W
A
. This is an implication of Jensen's inequality;
W
A
is a convex function of M .
Without restrictions on the parameter values, eqn. (43) for W
N
does not have an ana-
lytical solution. We will see shortly how this equation can be solved numerically forW
N
(M)
and, simultaneously, for the critical value M

. First we will consider the special case of
 = 0, for which W
N
(M) does have an analytical solution.
5.1 Environmental Damage Completely Irreversible ( = 0).
When  = 0, the solution for W
A
(M) in eqn. (48) reduces to:
W
A
(M) =  (rM
2
+ 
2
)=r
2
: (49)
As for eqn. (43), the homogeneous solution has the form W
N
= B
1
e

1
M
+ B
2
e

2
M
, and the
particular solution is a quadratic in M . By direct substitution, the solution for W
N
is:
W
N
(M) = Be
M
 
(rM
2
+ 
2
)
r
2
 
2E
0
(E
0
+ rM)
r
3
; (50)
where
 =  
E
0

2

1 
q
1 + 2r
2
=
2
E
2
0

> 0 ; (51)
and B is a constant that must be determined. The rst term on the right-hand side of
eqn. (50) is the value of the option to adopt the policy. The second term is the present value
of the ow of social cost from the current stock of the pollutant, M , allowing for stochastic
uctuations in M in the future. The third term is the present value of the ow of social
cost that would result if emissions continued at the rate E
0
forever, again accounting for
stochastic uctuations in M (which now also has a deterministic component of growth).
The constant B and the critical value M

can be found from the solution for W
A
(M)
along with the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (46) and (47):
B =
2E
0

r
2

e
 M

> 0 ; (52)
and
M

=  
E
0
r
 

2
E
0

1 
q
1 + 2r
2
=
2
E
2
0

+
r
2
K
2E
0

: (53)
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This solution has properties that we would expect. Note in particular that @M

=@K > 0,
@M

=@r > 0, @M

=@ < 0, and @M

=@ > 0. Thus stochastic uctuations in M create an
incentive to delay policy adoption. As a numerical example, and for comparison to results
shown below for the more general case of  > 0, we will set r = :04, K = 4, E
0
= .3,  =
1, and  = .002. Then, if  = 0, the policy should be adopted immediately for any value of
M . However, if  = 1, the policy should only be adopted when M  M

= 6:74, and when
 = 4, the policy should be adopted when M M

= 16:21,
5.2 General Case.
For the more general case of  > 0, W
N
(M) and the critical value M

must be found
numerically. This is done by utilizing the solution for W
A
(M) given by eqn. (48), along
with the boundary conditions (46) and (47). To obtain a numerical solution, we begin with
a candidate number (e.g., a best guess) for M

; call this M

0
. We then use eqns. (48), (46),
and (47) to get W
N
(M

0
) and W
N
M
(M

0
), and we solve eqn. (43) backwards to determine a
corresponding candidate solution forW
N
(M) for allM between 0 and M

0
. To be the actual
solution, the candidate solution must satisfy one regularity condition for all values of M
between 0 and M

0
, and a second condition at M = 0. First, since an increase in M always
implies a reduction in the ow of current and future social benets, we must have W
N
M
< 0
for all values ofM between 0 andM

. Second, because of the convexity of B(M; ), we must
have W
N
MM
< 0 at M = 0.
14
Thus the candidate number for M

is repeatedly adjusted up
or down (in smaller and smaller steps) until both of these conditions are satised.
Numerical Example.
This solution method is easiest to see in the context of a numerical example. We will
measure the stock of pollutant, M , in millions of tons, the emission rate in millions of tons
per year, and the value functions W
A
and W
N
and adoption cost K in billions of dollars.
Since the benet function is B =  M
2
, we measure  in billion dollars/(million tons)
2
. We
set K = 4, E
0
= .3,  = .002,  = 1,  = 0, and, as before, r = .04,  = .02, and  = 1.
14
If  = 0, we will have W
N
MM
 0 for all values of M between 0 and M

. However if  > 0 this condition
must apply only at M = 0, since M is increasing in M .
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Table 2: Solutions for M

.
(r = :04,  = 1, K = 4, E
0
= 0:3,  = :002)
M

  = 0  = :02
0.3 5.48 11.08
0.5 5.73 11.59
0.8 6.28 12.45
1.0 6.74 13.05
2.0 9.59 16.47
4.0 16.21 25.75
As Figure 5.2 shows, the solution for M

in this example is 13.05. The gure shows
candidate solutions forW
N
(M) corresponding to dierent values ofM

, along withW
A
(M) 
K. Note that for candidate values of M

below 13.05, W
N
M
(M) > 0 for small values of M ,
and for candidate values of M

above 13.05, W
N
MM
(M) > 0 for small M . The solution
procedure searches over candidate values of M

, using an increasingly narrow range.
Table 2 shows the critical value M

for values of  ranging from 0.3 to 4.0, and for 
equal to 0 and .02. The table shows that M

increases with , but it also shows how M

increases with . A higher  implies a lower (or negative) rate of drift for M | emissions
are more reversible, so the present value of the ow of social cost for any current value of M
is lower, and a higher M is needed to justify the sunk cost of policy adoption.
6 Conclusions.
I have focussed largely on a one-time policy adoption to reduce emissions of a pollutant. If
the policy imposes sunk costs on society, and if it can be delayed, there is an opportunity
cost of adopting the policy now rather than waiting for more information. This is analogous
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to the incentive to wait that arises with irreversible investment decisions. In the case of
environmental policy, however, this opportunity cost must be balanced against the opportu-
nity \benet" of early action | a reduced stock of pollutant that might decay only slowly,
imposing irreversible or nearly irreversible costs on society.
In the simple models presented in this paper, an increase in uncertainty, whether over
future costs and benets of reduced emissions, or over the evolution of the stock of pollutant,
leads to a higher threshold for policy adoption. This is because policy adoption involves a
sunk cost associated with a discrete reduction in the entire trajectory of future emissions,
whereas inaction over any small time interval only involves continued emissions over that
interval. This is true even for gradual emission reductions | a small reduction is a reduction
in the entire trajectory. Hence in my framework greater uncertainty always leads to greater
delay, although the eect is smaller the smaller is the decay rate, .
The validity of this result depends on the extent to which environmental policy is indeed
irreversible, in the sense of involving commitments to future ows of sunk costs. It seems to
me that this kind of irreversibility is often an inherent aspect of environmental policy, both
for policies that are in place (e.g., the Clean Air Act), and for policies under debate (e.g.,
GHG emission reductions). Nonetheless, the assumption of complete irreversibility made in
this paper (i.e., all costs of policy adoption are sunk) may be extreme. Richer models are
needed to explore the implications of relaxing this assumption somewhat.
In these models. economic and ecological uncertainty were treated separately. Ideally,
we would like to allow both  and M to evolve stochastically at the same time. This can be
done, but then the value functions W
A
(;M) and W
N
(;M) will satisfy more complicated
partial dierential equations that must be solved numerically. Solution methods for such
models are discussed in Pindyck (1996), but are beyond the scope of this paper.
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